Elena Kagan
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States — currently serving. Appointment, confirmation, tenure, and authored opinions. Coverage-honest — sections fill in as records land.
Elena Kagan
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States
Quick facts
- Current court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Appointed by
- Barack Hussein Obama 2
- Confirmation vote
- Confirmed 63–37
- Serving since
- August 6, 2010
- Opinions on file
- 20
Tenure
- Associate Justice Supreme Court of the United States
August 6, 2010 → present
Decision records Opinion types
Majority — the court's controlling, binding decision.
Concurrence — agrees with the outcome, but for different reasons.
Dissent — disagrees with the majority's decision.
Plurality — the largest bloc when no single reasoning wins a majority.
Per curiam — an unsigned opinion issued by the court as a whole.
- Majority Chatrie v. United States The Supreme Court held that police conducting a geofence warrant search of Google Location History data violated the Fourth Amendment because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information. The majority reasoned that Location History provides even more detailed location tracking than cell-site location information, pinpointing location within twenty meters and recording every two minutes, and implicates privacy interests similar to personal documents like emails and photographs. The Court rejected the government's argument that the third-party doctrine applied, finding that Location History is qualitatively different from traditional third-party records because users actively employ it as a personal journal and do not truly share it with Google in the normal sense. The Court held that while a Fourth Amendment search occurred, the warrant may satisfy requirements of particularity and probable cause but vacated and remanded for the lower court to determine whether each step of the multi-step search process was constitutional. Justice Kagan delivered the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, while Justice Gorsuch concurred in the judgment and Justices Alito and Barrett filed dissenting opinions.
- Majority Hunter v. United States Revisions: 6/19/26 The Supreme Court held that an appeal waiver in a plea agreement is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute—vacating the Fifth Circuit's judgment that had upheld Hunter's appeal waiver in a fraud case. The Court rejected both the Government's position that knowing and voluntary appeal waivers are always enforceable and the Fifth Circuit's position that they are unenforceable only when a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The Court reasoned that because district courts must accept plea agreements and appeal courts decide whether to enforce waivers, the judiciary has an institutional interest in ensuring that legal proceedings appear fair and that the judicial system's integrity is not compromised by enforcing waivers in cases involving egregious errors. The Court defined the miscarriage-of-justice standard as a high bar requiring an obvious error that would undermine public confidence in the judiciary, such as a sentence exceeding the statutory limit, consideration of impermissible factors like race, or a constitutionally infirm condition of supervised release. The case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit to determine whether Hunter's challenge to a mandatory mental-health medication condition satisfies this standard.
- Majority Hunter v. United States The Supreme Court held that an appeal waiver in a plea agreement is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute—reversing the Fifth Circuit's enforcement of Hunter's appeal waiver. The Court rejected both the Government's argument that knowing and voluntary appeal waivers are always enforceable and the Fifth Circuit's position that they are unenforceable only when a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. The Court reasoned that because district courts must approve plea agreements and appeal courts decide whether to enforce waivers, the judiciary has an independent institutional interest in ensuring legal proceedings appear fair and that the judicial system's integrity is not compromised by enforcing waivers involving egregious errors. The Court defined miscarriage of justice as an obvious error that would undermine public confidence in the judiciary, such as a sentence exceeding statutory limits, consideration of impermissible factors like race, or imposition of a constitutionally infirm condition of supervised release. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett filed concurring opinions, and Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion; the case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit to determine whether Hunter's challenge to a mandatory mental-health medication condition constitutes a miscarriage of justice.
- Majority Abouammo v. United States The Supreme Court held that a defendant charged with violating 18 USC §1519, which makes it a crime to knowingly falsify a document with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, must be tried in the district where the falsification occurred, not in the district where the investigation was located. The unanimous majority reasoned that the Constitution requires trials be held where crimes are committed, and courts determine venue by identifying where the offense's essential conduct elements occur, and under §1519 the only proscribed conduct is document falsification, which occurred in Seattle when Ahmad Abouammo created a fake invoice on his computer. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's argument that §1519's intent requirement made the "contemplated effects" of the falsification part of the essential conduct, finding instead that a statute's mens rea requirement has never been considered in determining venue and that §1519 is not an inchoate offense but a standalone crime complete upon falsification regardless of whether the false document actually obstructs an investigation. Justice Kagan delivered the unanimous opinion, emphasizing that the Founders protected the venue right to prevent unfair prosecution in remote locations and that venue must be based on the conduct §1519 prescribes—document falsification—not the conduct of other laws.
- Majority Abouammo v. United States Revisions: 6/16/26 The Supreme Court held that a defendant charged with violating 18 USC §1519, which makes it a crime to knowingly falsify a document with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, must be tried in the district where the falsification occurred, not in the district where the investigation was located. The unanimous majority reasoned that the Constitution requires trials be held where crimes are committed, and courts determine venue by identifying where the offense's essential conduct elements occur, and under §1519 the only proscribed conduct is document falsification, which occurred in Seattle when Ahmad Abouammo created a fake invoice on his computer. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's argument that §1519's intent requirement made the "contemplated effects" of the falsification part of the essential conduct, finding instead that a statute's mens rea requirement has never been considered in determining venue and that §1519 is not an inchoate offense but a standalone crime complete upon falsification regardless of whether the false document actually obstructs an investigation. Justice Kagan delivered the unanimous opinion, emphasizing that the Founders protected the venue right to prevent unfair prosecution in remote locations and that venue must be based on the conduct §1519 prescribes—document falsification—not the conduct of other laws.
- Majority Olivier v. City of Brandon Gabriel Olivier, a street preacher convicted in 2021 for violating a Brandon, Mississippi ordinance restricting protests near a public amphitheater, sued the city seeking a court order declaring the ordinance unconstitutional and preventing its future enforcement. The city argued that the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Heck v. Humphrey barred any lawsuit by someone previously convicted under the challenged law. The Supreme Court held unanimously that Olivier's suit can proceed because it seeks only prospective relief—preventing future enforcement of the ordinance—rather than overturning his prior conviction or obtaining damages. The Court reasoned that Heck's bar applies only to suits that challenge a conviction's validity to obtain release from custody or monetary compensation, whereas Olivier's suit is entirely forward-looking and does not attempt to undermine his prior conviction. Since Olivier's claim falls outside the core concerns of habeas corpus law that Heck was designed to protect, the suit may proceed in federal court.
- Majority Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal The Supreme Court held that a district court's pretrial order denying Yearsley protection to a federal contractor is not immediately appealable. The majority reasoned that Yearsley provides contractors a defense to liability—allowing them to show their conduct complied with law—rather than an immunity from suit, and because the right to a finding of non-liability can be vindicated on appeal from a final judgment, the order need not be immediately reviewed. The Court distinguished between immunity from suit (which allows defendants to escape trial entirely and is thus irretrievably lost if trial occurs) and a merits defense (which allows review of whether the defendant should be found liable and can be effectively reviewed after trial). Justices Thomas and Alito filed separate concurring opinions.
- Majority Case v. Montana The Supreme Court unanimously held that police officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance if they have an "objectively reasonable basis for believing" that an occupant faces serious danger, rejecting a requirement that officers have probable cause. William Case challenged a warrantless police entry into his home after he called his ex-girlfriend and made suicidal statements; officers responded and found him hiding in a closet, leading to a shooting and his arrest for assaulting a police officer. The Court reasoned that the probable cause standard, which applies to criminal investigations, should not apply to emergency-aid situations, which are non-criminal and non-investigatory in nature. Instead, the Court applied the objective reasonableness standard from Brigham City v. Stuart, finding that officers had an objectively reasonable basis for entering Case's home based on his ex-girlfriend's report of his suicidal threats, his known history of mental health issues, and the visible signs of a handgun holster and suicide note. Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.
- Majority Department of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition The Supreme Court granted the Government's application for a stay of a District Court order directing the Executive to obligate approximately $10.5 billion in foreign-aid appropriations that Congress passed but the President sought to withhold or rescind. Organizations receiving the foreign aid challenged the President's freeze of the funds as an unlawful impoundment in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The majority determined that the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) precludes the respondents' APA suit and that the Executive's asserted harms to foreign affairs policy outweigh the harm to respondents, characterizing the decision as a preliminary view of the issues. In a dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, Justice Kagan argued the Executive had not met the high bar for emergency relief, that the ICA's explicit disclaimer provision allows private parties to sue over impoundments regardless of when the statute was enacted, and that the case involves novel constitutional questions about the separation of powers deserving careful consideration rather than emergency intervention.
- Majority Trump v. Slaughter The Supreme Court granted the President's application for a stay and petition for certiorari before judgment in a case challenging the President's authority to discharge a member of the Federal Trade Commission without cause. The stay enables the President to immediately remove the FTC member while the case proceeds through Supreme Court review. The Court directed the parties to brief two questions: whether statutory removal protections for FTC members violate the separation of powers doctrine and whether Humphrey's Executor v. United States should be overruled, and whether courts can prevent removal from public office. In a dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, Justice Kagan argued this represents the latest in a series of stays that improperly transfer authority from Congress to the President by violating Humphrey's Executor, which has stood for nearly 90 years in holding that Congress may restrict presidential removal of independent agency members. Kagan contended the emergency docket should not be used to permit violations of existing Supreme Court precedent or to reshape the separation of powers by transferring government authority from Congress to the President.
- Majority Trump v. Boyle The Supreme Court granted the President's application for a stay allowing him to discharge members of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) without cause, citing its prior decision in Trump v. Wilcox which permitted similar removals from other independent agencies. The majority reasoned that the case was controlled by Wilcox, holding that the Government faces greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed officer to continue exercising executive power than an officer faces from being unable to perform statutory duties. Justice Kavanaugh concurred in granting the stay but argued the Court should have also granted certiorari before judgment to provide clarity about whether the Court intends to narrow or overrule Humphrey's Executor v. United States, noting that when emergency applications turn on overruling precedent, granting both a stay and certiorari avoids extended uncertainty. In a dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, Justice Kagan argued the majority has effectively overturned Humphrey's Executor by allowing the President to remove independent agency commissioners without cause, contrary to Congressional design, and has done so through a series of minimally explained emergency orders that layer nothing on nothing. Kagan contended this represents a pattern of permanently transferring authority from Congress to the President through the emergency docket, pointing to a similar stay last week allowing the President to dismantle the Department of Education despite Congressional creation of the agency.
- Majority FCC v. Consumers' Research The Supreme Court upheld the universal-service contribution scheme against a constitutional challenge that it violated the nondelegation doctrine, which restricts Congress's power to delegate legislative authority to executive agencies. Consumers' Research had argued that the scheme violated a special nondelegation rule for revenue-raising statutes requiring a numeric cap on how much money agencies could collect, but the Court rejected this argument as inconsistent with precedent and noted it would invalidate numerous other federal statutes. The Court found that Section 254 of the Communications Act provides sufficient guidance through its specification of beneficiaries, service requirements, and the use of the term "sufficient" to define how much the FCC can collect. The Court also rejected the argument that the FCC's use of a private administrator to help manage the fund violated the nondelegation doctrine, finding that the administrator remains subordinate to the FCC and subject to its oversight and approval. Finally, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's theory that even if Congress's delegation and the FCC's subdelegation were individually permissible, their combination could be unconstitutional.
- Majority FCC v. Consumers' Research The Supreme Court held that the universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, reversing the Fifth Circuit's decision. The scheme requires telecommunications carriers to contribute to a federal fund used to subsidize communications services for low-income consumers, rural areas, schools, and libraries. The Court reasoned that Section 254 of the Communications Act provides an intelligible principle by directing the FCC to collect "sufficient" contributions while providing determinate standards through specific beneficiary designations and service requirements that must be essential, widely subscribed, and affordable. The Court rejected Consumers' Research's argument that tax statutes require Congress to impose a numeric cap or fixed tax rate, finding no such special requirement in precedent and noting that applying such a rule would throw many federal statutes into doubt. The Court also held that the FCC's use of a private Administrator Company to manage the fund does not violate the nondelegation doctrine because the Administrator functions subordinately to the FCC, which retains final authority over the contribution factor.
- Majority Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos The Government of Mexico sued seven American gun manufacturers, alleging they aided and abetted unlawful firearms sales by gun dealers who routed weapons to Mexican drug cartels, claiming the manufacturers knew certain dealers illegally sold to traffickers, failed to regulate their distribution networks, and made design and marketing decisions intended to stimulate cartel demand. Mexico claimed the manufacturers' conduct fell within an exception to the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which generally bars lawsuits against gun manufacturers for harms from criminal misuse of firearms, but allows suits when defendants knowingly violated firearms laws and that violation was a proximate cause of harm. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the First Circuit and held that Mexico's complaint does not plausibly allege that the manufacturers aided and abetted unlawful gun sales and therefore PLCAA bars the lawsuit. Justice Kagan's majority opinion reasoned that to establish aiding and abetting requires an affirmative act in furtherance of the offense and intent to facilitate it, and that mere knowledge of some dealers' unlawful conduct without more constitutes "indifference" rather than assistance, similar to claims dismissed against social media companies for inadequate removal of terrorist content. The Court noted that accepting Mexico's theory would essentially swallow PLCAA's prohibition against such suits, which Congress enacted to prevent manufacturers from being held liable for the criminal misuse of lawful products, and Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson filed concurring opinions.
- Majority Barnes v. Felix Officer Roberto Felix pulled over Ashtian Barnes for toll violations; when Barnes began driving away, Felix jumped onto the moving car and fired two shots that fatally wounded him, all within a five-second span. The Fifth Circuit had upheld the shooting using a "moment-of-threat" rule that looked only at the two seconds when Felix was on the doorsill, excluding all prior circumstances from the analysis. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims must be analyzed under the "totality of the circumstances," with no time limit on what facts courts may consider. The Court reasoned that prior events and earlier interactions may be essential to understanding whether an officer reasonably perceived a threat, and that a rule limiting courts to the precise moment of the shooting improperly narrows the required inquiry by putting on "chronological blinders." The case was vacated and remanded for reconsideration using the proper totality-of-circumstances framework.
- Majority Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. Dewberry Engineers sued competitor Dewberry Group for trademark infringement, winning the case and seeking to recover the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, but the problem was that Dewberry Group reported no profits—all profits were on the books of about 30 separately incorporated affiliates also owned by the same developer. The District Court treated Dewberry Group and its affiliates as a single corporate entity and totaled the affiliates' real-estate profits, awarding nearly $43 million, which the Fourth Circuit affirmed as reflecting the "economic reality" and preventing the company from using corporate formalities to evade consequences. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that under the Lanham Act, a court can award only profits ascribable to the "defendant" itself, and the defendant bears its usual legal meaning of the party named in the lawsuit. The Court reasoned that American corporate law establishes that separately incorporated organizations are separate legal units with distinct rights and obligations, even if commonly owned, and that the Lanham Act's text requires the "defendant's profits" to be the defendant's profits, not the defendant's plus its affiliates'. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, and the Court left open questions about whether courts could use other statutory provisions or corporate veil-piercing to reach affiliate profits on remand.
- Majority Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath Auditor Todd Heath sued telecommunications carrier Wisconsin Bell under the False Claims Act for allegedly violating the E-Rate program's "lowest corresponding price" rule by charging schools higher prices than similarly situated non-residential customers, causing the program to overpay subsidies to schools. Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss, arguing that E-Rate reimbursement requests cannot qualify as "claims" under the False Claims Act because the money is supplied by private carriers and administered by a private corporation, not the Government. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, holding that E-Rate reimbursement requests are "claims" under the False Claims Act because the Government "provided" a portion of the money sought by transferring over $100 million from the Treasury into the fund in the relevant years. The Court reasoned that "provided" means supplied or made available, and the Government actively collected and routed the $100 million (consisting of delinquent carrier contributions and settlements for wrongdoing) through Treasury accounts, rather than serving as a passive intermediary. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, with Justice Thomas and Kavanaugh filing concurring opinions.
- Majority Royal Canin U. S. A. v. Wullschleger Anastasia Wullschleger sued Royal Canin in state court for deceptive marketing, asserting both federal and state law claims, and Royal Canin removed the case to federal court based on federal-question jurisdiction, with the federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the related state claims. After removal, Wullschleger amended her complaint to delete all federal-law claims, leaving only state-law claims, and asked the District Court to remand the case back to state court. The District Court refused the remand, but the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered remand, holding that the amendment eliminating the federal claims also eliminated the basis for supplemental jurisdiction. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, holding that when a plaintiff amends a complaint after removal to delete the federal claims that enabled removal, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims and must remand the case to state court. The Court reasoned that under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, jurisdiction is determined by looking to the amended complaint, and the rule that jurisdiction follows the operative pleading applies equally in removed and originally filed cases. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
- Majority Muldrow v. City of St. Louis Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow worked in the St. Louis Police Department's specialized Intelligence Division for nine years, where she investigated public corruption and human trafficking and held FBI credentials and an unmarked take-home vehicle, but was transferred out at the request of a new commander who wanted to replace her with a male officer. After the transfer, Muldrow retained her rank and pay but lost her FBI credentials, unmarked vehicle, and her role investigating major cases, instead supervising routine neighborhood patrol officers with a less regular schedule including weekend shifts. Muldrow sued under Title VII alleging sex discrimination regarding the "terms [or] conditions" of employment, but the District Court and Eighth Circuit dismissed the suit because they required her to show the transfer caused a "materially significant disadvantage," which they found she could not demonstrate. The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision, holding that while an employee must show some harm from a job transfer to prevail under Title VII, the harm need not be "significant" or meet any heightened threshold—the statute requires only that the employee show some disadvantageous change in an identifiable term or condition of employment. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh each filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
- Majority Pulsifer v. United States Mark Pulsifer pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine and faced a mandatory 15-year minimum sentence, but sought "safety valve" relief under federal law, which exempts certain defendants from mandatory minimums if they meet five criteria, including a criminal-history requirement. The criminal-history requirement specifies that a defendant cannot have: (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a prior 3-point offense, or (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, with the parties disagreeing on whether all three conditions must be satisfied separately or whether only the combination of all three disqualifies a defendant. Pulsifer had two prior 3-point offenses totaling six points but no 2-point violent offense, and he argued he qualified because he lacked the complete combination of factors in all three categories. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts in a 5-3 decision, holding that the criminal-history requirement operates as a three-part checklist, and a defendant is ineligible for safety-valve relief if he has any one of the three factors, not just if he has all three combined. Justice Kagan reasoned that Pulsifer's interpretation would render one provision of the statute superfluous and would create a perverse result where defendants with more serious records could get relief while those with less serious ones could not, violating the gatekeeping purpose of the requirement. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson.
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