Amy Coney Barrett
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States — currently serving. Appointment, confirmation, tenure, and authored opinions. Coverage-honest — sections fill in as records land.
Amy Coney Barrett
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States
Quick facts
- Current court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Appointed by
- Donald John Trump
- Confirmation vote
- Confirmed 52–48
- Serving since
- October 27, 2020
- Opinions on file
- 20
Tenure
- Associate Justice Supreme Court of the United States
October 27, 2020 → present
- Judge Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
November 2, 2017 → January 1, 2020
- Associate Justice Supreme Court of the United States
January 1, 1998 → January 1, 1999
- clerk District Court, District of Columbia
January 1, 1997 → January 1, 1998
Decision records Opinion types
Majority — the court's controlling, binding decision.
Concurrence — agrees with the outcome, but for different reasons.
Dissent — disagrees with the majority's decision.
Plurality — the largest bloc when no single reasoning wins a majority.
Per curiam — an unsigned opinion issued by the court as a whole.
- Majority Watson v. Republican National Committee The Supreme Court held that federal election-day statutes do not preempt Mississippi's law permitting the counting of absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days later. The majority reasoned that the word "election" in the federal statutes refers to the act of voting (ballot casting), not ballot receipt, a meaning supported by historical usage and confirmed by Congress's recent amendments to the Presidential election statute. The Court found that the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act presupposes that states retain the power to set ballot-receipt deadlines, and that the Constitution requires a uniform day for voting but says nothing about receipt. The majority rejected arguments based on nineteenth-century historical practice, concluding that statutes do not lock in every contemporary practice, and that policy arguments about election integrity should be directed to legislatures rather than courts. Justice Barrett delivered the majority opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, while Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined in full by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch and in part by Justice Kavanaugh.
- Majority Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe The Supreme Court held that federal courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision allowing such claims to proceed against Cisco Systems for alleged aiding and abetting of human rights violations by the Chinese government. The Court reasoned that creating new ATS causes of action would intrude on Congress's prerogative to provide rights of action and the political branches' authority to direct foreign policy, and that ATS cases inherently implicate sensitive foreign relations matters where it would be difficult for courts to safely conclude that creating new liability would not cause diplomatic harm. The Court noted that Congress has created an alternative remedy through the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which precludes courts from fashioning new causes of action under the ATS. The Court also held that the TVPA, which provides a cause of action against those who "subject" another to torture, does not encompass aiding-and-abetting liability because Congress did not expressly provide for such liability and because "aiding and abetting" involves assistance several steps removed from the direct torturer, which differs from the statutory language requiring a direct causal connection. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred in part and dissented in part, and Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson as to certain parts.
- Majority FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. The Supreme Court held that Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the Act, reversing the Second Circuit's decision that had allowed activist investor Saba Capital to proceed with such a lawsuit against closed-end mutual funds. The Court reasoned that Congress, not the judiciary, decides who may enforce federal law, and when Congress creates a private right of action, it usually does so expressly; because Section 47(b) must be interpreted as a mandate directed to courts rather than a provision conferring rights on individuals, it does not create an implied private right of action. The Court found that Section 47(b)'s language presupposes that parties are already before a court and directs the court's use of its remedial authority, rather than conferring a right to sue in the first place. The Court also noted that statutory structure supports this conclusion because the Securities and Exchange Commission bears primary responsibility for ensuring ICA compliance and may bring enforcement actions, indicating Congress intended a comprehensive agency enforcement scheme rather than private enforcement. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, and Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan as to certain parts.
- Majority Rutherford v. United States The Supreme Court held that the sentencing disparity created by Congress's nonretroactive change to §924(c)'s mandatory penalties cannot serve as an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Barrett reasoned that nonretroactive sentencing changes are ordinary practice rather than extraordinary, and that Congress's deliberate choice not to extend the reduced penalties to those already sentenced reflects its interest in finality and should not be undermined by courts granting compassionate release. The majority also held that the Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement adding "unusually long sentences" as grounds for compassionate release conflicts with the statutory text and is therefore invalid to the extent it permits courts to consider sentencing disparities from nonretroactive changes. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, though the dissenting opinion was not included in the provided text. The decision affirmed the Third Circuit's judgment in both consolidated cases, denying Rutherford and Carter relief based on the First Step Act disparity.
- Majority Fernandez v. United States The Supreme Court held 6-3 that prisoners challenging the validity of their convictions must proceed through the collateral attack statute (28 U.S.C. §2255), not through the compassionate release statute (18 U.S.C. §3582), and that conviction invalidity does not constitute an "extraordinary and compelling reason" for compassionate release. Justice Barrett, writing for the majority, reasoned that §2255 imposes strict procedural requirements designed specifically for conviction challenges, while §3582 is intended for mercy-based relief based on personal circumstances like age and illness. The Court concluded that allowing conviction challenges through §3582 would allow prisoners to bypass §2255's requirements, including its statute of limitations and one-shot rule, and that the term "extraordinary and compelling reasons" refers to personal circumstances, not legal arguments about trial errors. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson dissented.
- Majority Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC The Supreme Court unanimously held that state negligent-hiring claims against transportation brokers are not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), even though the act generally preempts state laws regulating prices, routes, and services in the trucking industry. The Court found that such claims fall within the FAAAA's safety exception, which preserves states' authority to regulate safety "with respect to motor vehicles." The Court reasoned that negligent-hiring claims "concern" motor vehicles because they impose a duty of reasonable care in selecting carriers, and therefore constitute regulation of motor vehicle safety. The case involved Shawn Montgomery, who was injured when a truck driver struck his vehicle, with the truck being operated for a carrier selected by broker C.H. Robinson. The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
- Majority Berk v. Choy The Supreme Court held that Delaware's requirement that medical malpractice complaints be accompanied by an affidavit of merit from a medical professional does not apply in federal court, reversing the Third Circuit's decision. Harold Berk sued for medical malpractice under Delaware law after allegedly suffering injuries due to negligent treatment, but he failed to file the required affidavit of merit before his complaint was dismissed. The Court reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim," directly answers the question of what must accompany a complaint and therefore displaces the conflicting Delaware state law. When a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure addresses the disputed issue, it governs even if the state law would otherwise be considered substantive under the Erie doctrine, because the Rules Enabling Act authorizes federal rules to override state law. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, indicating agreement with the result but potentially different reasoning.
- Majority Trump v. CASA, Inc. President Trump challenged universal injunctions issued by District Courts that barred enforcement of his Executive Order on citizenship against anyone, arguing that the courts lacked the legal authority to issue such sweeping relief. The Supreme Court decided the case on this threshold question of judicial authority without addressing whether the Executive Order itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment or the Nationality Act. The Court held that universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress granted to federal courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorizes only remedies "traditionally accorded by courts of equity" at the nation's founding. The Court reasoned that traditional equity practice in England and founding-era America limited judicial remedies to parties in the case, and universal injunctions, which have no historical precedent, fall outside that traditional scope. The Court granted partial stays limiting the injunctions to the named plaintiffs in each case, requiring lower courts to reconsider whether narrower relief would adequately address the plaintiffs' injuries.
- Majority Trump v. CASA, Inc. Revisions: 6/27/25 The Supreme Court held that universal injunctions—injunctions barring enforcement of executive or legislative action against anyone, not just the plaintiffs in a case—likely exceed the equitable authority Congress granted to federal courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789, and granted the Government's applications for partial stays of three preliminary injunctions challenging an executive order on birthright citizenship. The Court reasoned that federal courts may only exercise equitable remedies that were "traditionally accorded by courts of equity" at the country's founding, and universal injunctions have no historical analogue in founding-era English or American equity practice, where remedies were party-specific and individual in nature. The Court rejected the argument that universal injunctions are the modern equivalent of "bills of peace," a historical group-litigation procedure, because bills of peace involved small, cohesive groups and bound all members of a group whether or not they were parties to the action, whereas they were replaced by the class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which provides procedural protections that universal injunctions bypass. The Court determined that the Government is likely to suffer irreparable harm from universal injunctions that improperly intrude on the executive branch's authority, and remanded for lower courts to determine whether narrower, party-specific injunctions would adequately remedy the plaintiffs' harms. The decision does not address the underlying constitutional or statutory questions regarding whether the executive order lawfully interprets the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act.
- Majority Trump v. CASA, Inc. Revisions: 7/02/25 The Supreme Court held that federal courts likely lack equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue universal injunctions that bar enforcement of an executive order against everyone, rather than just the parties to the lawsuit. The Court granted a partial stay of the preliminary injunctions against President Trump's Executive Order on citizenship, limiting the scope of relief to the named plaintiffs. The Court reasoned that federal equitable authority is limited to remedies "traditionally accorded by courts of equity" at the nation's founding, and universal injunctions have no historical precedent in founding-era English or American equity practice. The Court found that historical equitable remedies were party-specific and designed to provide relief between the parties themselves, distinguishing the historical "bill of peace" from universal injunctions. The Court also determined that the Government likely suffers irreparable harm from universal injunctions and that the balance of equities supports the partial stay.
- Majority Trump v. CASA, Inc. The Supreme Court held that universal injunctions—injunctions barring enforcement of executive or legislative action against anyone, not just the plaintiffs in a case—likely exceed the equitable authority Congress granted to federal courts under the Judiciary Act of 1789, and granted the Government's applications for partial stays of three preliminary injunctions challenging an executive order on birthright citizenship. The Court reasoned that federal courts may only exercise equitable remedies that were "traditionally accorded by courts of equity" at the country's founding, and universal injunctions have no historical analogue in founding-era English or American equity practice, where remedies were party-specific and individual in nature. The Court rejected the argument that universal injunctions are the modern equivalent of "bills of peace," a historical group-litigation procedure, because bills of peace involved small, cohesive groups and were replaced by the class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which provides procedural protections that universal injunctions bypass. The Court determined that the Government is likely to succeed on the merits and suffers irreparable harm from universal injunctions that improperly intrude on the executive branch's authority, and remanded for lower courts to determine whether narrower, party-specific injunctions would adequately remedy the plaintiffs' harms. The decision does not address the underlying constitutional or statutory questions regarding whether the executive order lawfully interprets the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act.
- Majority Trump v. CASA, Inc. Revisions: 6/27/25 The Supreme Court held that federal courts likely lack equitable authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to issue universal injunctions that bar enforcement of an executive order against everyone, rather than just the parties to the lawsuit. The Court granted a partial stay of the preliminary injunctions against President Trump's Executive Order on citizenship, limiting the scope of relief to the named plaintiffs. The Court reasoned that federal equitable authority is limited to remedies "traditionally accorded by courts of equity" at the nation's founding, and universal injunctions have no historical precedent in founding-era English or American equity practice. The Court found that historical equitable remedies were party-specific and designed to provide relief between the parties themselves, distinguishing the historical "bill of peace" from universal injunctions. The Court also determined that the Government likely suffers irreparable harm from universal injunctions and that the balance of equities supports the partial stay.
- Majority Esteras v. United States The Supreme Court held that district courts cannot consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—which directs courts to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment—when deciding whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release. The case involved Edgardo Esteras, who was sentenced to 12 months in prison and 6 years of supervised release for drug conspiracy, and whose supervised release was revoked after he was arrested for domestic violence. Justice Barrett's majority opinion reasoned that Congress deliberately omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the factors courts must consider when revoking supervised release, using the legal principle that expressing one item while omitting another implies the omitted item should not be considered. The Court also emphasized that supervised release serves rehabilitative purposes rather than punishment, so courts should focus on forward-looking sentencing goals like rehabilitation and deterrence, not backward-looking retribution. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch, and Justices Sotomayor and Jackson filed separate concurring opinions.
- Majority FDA v. R. J. Reynolds Vapor Co. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. sought FDA approval to sell its Vuse Alto e-cigarettes under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, but the FDA denied the application as not being appropriate for public health protection. R.J. Reynolds then filed a joint petition for judicial review with retailers who sold Vuse Alto products in the Fifth Circuit, but the FDA argued that only the manufacturer applicant—not the retailers—could challenge the denial as "adversely affected" persons under the statute. The Supreme Court held in a 6-2 decision that retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order are "adversely affected" and may seek judicial review of the denial. The Court reasoned that "adversely affected" is a term of art in administrative law interpreted broadly under the Administrative Procedure Act, and the same broad interpretation applies to the TCA, which says "any person adversely affected" can petition for review, and retailers clearly lose profits from the denial and face sanctions if they sell anyway. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor disagreeing with the majority's interpretation.
- Majority Esteras v. United States The Supreme Court held that district courts cannot consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—which directs courts to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment—when deciding whether to revoke a defendant's term of supervised release. The case involved Edgardo Esteras, who was sentenced to 12 months in prison and 6 years of supervised release for drug conspiracy, and whose supervised release was revoked after he was arrested for domestic violence. Justice Barrett's majority opinion reasoned that Congress deliberately omitted § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the factors courts must consider when revoking supervised release, using the legal principle that expressing one item while omitting another implies the omitted item should not be considered. The Court also emphasized that supervised release serves rehabilitative purposes rather than punishment, so courts should focus on forward-looking sentencing goals like rehabilitation and deterrence, not backward-looking retribution. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch, and Justices Sotomayor and Jackson filed separate concurring opinions.
- Majority FDA v. R. J. Reynolds Vapor Co. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. sought FDA approval to sell its Vuse Alto e-cigarettes under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, but the FDA denied the application as not being appropriate for public health protection. R.J. Reynolds then filed a joint petition for judicial review with retailers who sold Vuse Alto products in the Fifth Circuit, but the FDA argued that only the manufacturer applicant—not the retailers—could challenge the denial as "adversely affected" persons under the statute. The Supreme Court held in a 6-2 decision that retailers who would sell a new tobacco product if not for the FDA's denial order are "adversely affected" and may seek judicial review of the denial. The Court reasoned that "adversely affected" is a term of art in administrative law interpreted broadly under the Administrative Procedure Act, and the same broad interpretation applies to the TCA, which says "any person adversely affected" can petition for review, and retailers clearly lose profits from the denial and face sanctions if they sell anyway. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor disagreeing with the majority's interpretation.
- Majority Commissioner v. Zuch The Supreme Court held that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from collection due process hearings once the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy against a taxpayer, reversing the Third Circuit's decision. The case involved Jennifer Zuch, who disputed the IRS's allocation of $50,000 in tax payments to her ex-husband's account and sought a refund; during the Tax Court proceedings, she overpaid her taxes in other years, which the IRS applied to her disputed 2010 liability until the balance reached zero. Justice Barrett's majority opinion reasoned that under § 6330, the "determination" that the Tax Court reviews is the binary decision whether a levy can proceed, not broader disputes about tax liability; the statute's focus on levies means the Tax Court's jurisdiction ends once there is no basis for a levy. The Court found that allowing Tax Court review of tax liability disputes after a levy is abandoned would circumvent the default rule requiring taxpayers to pay disputed taxes first and then sue for refunds, which is the proper avenue for Zuch's claims. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.
- Majority Kousisis v. United States Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting and Construction Co. won government contracts to paint Philadelphia landmarks but falsely represented that they would hire a disadvantaged business enterprise for supplies, when in fact they used a pass-through entity that provided nothing. Convicted of wire fraud under a fraudulent-inducement theory, they argued the conviction must fail because PennDOT received good painting work and suffered no economic loss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a defendant can be convicted of federal wire fraud when they use material misstatements to induce someone into a transaction, even if the defendant provides something of value in return and the victim suffers no net economic loss. The Court reasoned that the wire fraud statute requires proving the defendant targeted money or property but does not require proving economic loss, and that common-law fraud historically did not always require net loss in false-pretenses cases. The Court noted that the materiality of false statements serves as a limiting principle to prevent every misrepresentation from becoming criminal fraud.
- Majority Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Kennedy More than 200 hospitals challenged the Department of Health and Human Services' calculation of Medicare "disproportionate share hospital" adjustments, which provide additional funding to hospitals serving high percentages of low-income patients, based on the definition of patients "entitled to supplementary security income benefits." The hospitals argued that "entitled to SSI benefits" includes all patients enrolled in the SSI system during hospitalization, even if they were ineligible for an SSI cash payment that month, whereas HHS interpreted it to mean patients eligible to receive a cash SSI payment during their hospitalization month. The Supreme Court affirmed HHS's interpretation in a 7-2 decision, holding that an individual is "entitled to SSI benefits" when eligible to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of hospitalization. The Court reasoned that SSI benefits are cash benefits with eligibility determined monthly based on income and resources for that specific month, and that "entitled" means the same as "eligible" for purposes of this calculation. Justices Jackson and Sotomayor dissented.
- Majority Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn Douglas Horn purchased a CBD tincture from Medical Marijuana, Inc. that was advertised as containing 0% THC, but he tested positive for THC on a drug screening and was fired from his truck driver job. Horn sued under the federal RICO statute, which allows recovery for those "injured in his business or property," but Medical Marijuana argued that because Horn's job loss resulted from a personal injury (ingesting THC), he could not recover for business or property damages. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit in a 5-4 decision, holding that civil RICO allows recovery for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury. The Court reasoned that the statute bars recovery for harm to one's person but permits recovery for harm to business or property regardless of what caused it, and that "injured" should bear its ordinary meaning of "harmed" rather than Medical Marijuana's proposed definition based on legal rights. Justice Thomas dissented, and Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
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