HR 4506

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 17, 2025

Mr. Keating (for himself and Mrs. Kim) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To require the development of a strategy to promote the use of secure telecommunications infrastructure worldwide, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Securing Global Telecommunications Act”.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1) The United States Government should promote and take steps to ensure American leadership in strategic technology industries, including telecommunications infrastructure and other information and communications technologies.

(2) The expansive presence of companies linked to the Chinese Communist Party, such as Huawei, in global mobile networks and the national security implications thereof, such as the ability of the People’s Republic of China to exfiltrate the information flowing through those networks and shut off countries’ internet access, demonstrates the importance of the United States remaining at the technological frontier and the dire consequences of falling behind.

(3) The significant cost of countering Huawei’s market leadership in telecommunications infrastructure around the world underscores the urgency of supporting the competitiveness of United States companies in next-generation information and communication technology.

(4) To remain a leader at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and preserve the ITU’s technical integrity, the United States must work with emerging economies and developing nations to bolster global telecommunications security and protect American national security interests.

(5) Multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners and allies is critical to carry out the significant effort of financing and promoting secure networks around the world and to achieve market leadership of trusted vendors in this sector.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY FOR SECURING GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Strategy Required.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and Energy and Commerce and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a strategy, to be known as the “Strategy to Secure Global Telecommunications Infrastructure” (referred to in this Act as the “Strategy”), to promote the use of secure telecommunication infrastructure in countries other than the United States.

(b) Consultation Required.—The Secretary of State shall consult with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Director of the Trade and Development Agency, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, in developing the Strategy, which shall consist of an approach led by the Department of State using the policy tools, and informed by the technical expertise, of the other Federal entities so consulted to achieve the goal described in subsection (a).

(c) Elements.—The Strategy shall also include sections on each of the following:

(1) Mobile networks, including a description of efforts by countries other than the United States to—

(A) promote trusted Open RAN technologies while protecting against any security risks posed by untrusted vendors in Open RAN networks;

(B) use financing mechanisms to assist “rip-and- replace” projects and to incentivize countries to choose trusted equipment vendors;

(C) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted wireless networks worldwide; and

(D) collaborate with trusted private sector companies to counter Chinese market leadership in the telecom equipment industry.

(2) Data centers, including a description of efforts to—

(A) utilize financing mechanisms to incentivize countries other than the United States to choose trusted data center providers; and

(B) bolster multilateral cooperation, especially with developing countries and emerging economies, to promote the deployment of trusted data centers worldwide.

(3) Sixth (and future) generation technologies (6G), including a description of efforts to—

(A) deepen cooperation with like-minded countries to promote United States and allied market leadership in 6G networks and technologies; and

(B) increase buy-in from developing countries and emerging countries on trusted technologies.

(4) Low-Earth orbit satellites, aerostats, and stratospheric balloons, including a description of efforts to work with trusted private sector companies to retain the ability to quickly provide internet connection in response to emergency situations.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON MALIGN INFLUENCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION.

(a) Report.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Foreign Relations and Commerce, Science, and Transportation the Senate a report on Russian and Chinese strategies and efforts—

(1) to expand the mandate of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to cover internet governance policy; and

(2) to advance other actions favorable to authoritarian interests and/or hostile to fair, industry-led processes.

(b) Elements.—The report required by subsection (a) shall also identify efforts by China and Russia—

(1) to increase the ITU’s jurisdiction over internet governance and to propose internet governance standards at the ITU;

(2) to leverage their private sector actors to advance their national interests through the ITU, including—

(A) encouraging Chinese and Russian companies to leverage their market power to pressure other member countries to deliver favorable decisions on ITU elections; and

(B) China’s efforts to leverage Huawei’s role as the primary telecommunications equipment and services provider for many developing countries to compel such countries to deliver favorable decisions on standards proposals, election victories, candidate selection, and other levers of power at the ITU; and

(3) to use the influence of Chinese and Russian nationals serving in the ITU to advantage the companies, standards decisions, and candidates that advance the CCP and Kremlin’s interests.

(c) Form.—The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. REPORT ON MULTILATERAL COORDINATION.

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Administrator for the United States Agency on International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, the Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, shall develop and submit to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Energy and Commerce and of the House of Representatives and the Committees Foreign Relations and on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and of the Senate a report that identifies opportunities for greater collaboration with allies and partners to promote secure information and communications technology infrastructure in countries other than the United States, including through—

(1) joint financing efforts to help trusted vendors win bids to build out information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure;

(2) incorporating ICT focuses into allies’ and partners’ international development finance initiatives; and

(3) diplomatic coordination to emphasize the importance of secure telecommunications infrastructure to countries using untrusted providers. <all>