HR 1701 Passed House Re-checks Congress.gov for new actions and updates the bill's status, and fills in any sponsors, committees, or related bills that are missing. It does not re-pull sponsors/cosponsors/committees/related — those rarely change — and it skips all work if nothing has changed upstream, so it's cheap to click.
Summary
This act requires the Secretary of State and Defense to develop a global map of strategically important ports and identify efforts by China and other entities to build, buy, or control them. They must study how Chinese control over overseas ports and maritime infrastructure could affect US national security and economic interests, and develop strategies to secure trusted investment in strategic ports while countering Chinese influence. Within one year, they must submit a comprehensive report to Congress detailing Chinese-controlled and US-controlled strategic ports, identified vulnerabilities, analysis of China's activities, and recommended courses of action with identified funding sources.
AI-generated plain-language summary of the bill text — neutral, and may be imperfect. See the full text below for the exact wording.
Sponsor (1)
- Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4] (R-MI)
16 cosponsors
- Del. Moylan, James C. [R-GU-At Large] (R-GU)
- Del. Radewagen, Aumua Amata Coleman [R-AS-At Large] (R-AS)
- Rep. Auchincloss, Jake [D-MA-4] (D-MA)
- Rep. Baird, James R. [R-IN-4] (R-IN)
- Rep. Begich, Nicholas J. [R-AK-At Large] (R-AK)
- Rep. Bost, Mike [R-IL-12] (R-IL)
- Rep. Calvert, Ken [R-CA-41] (R-CA)
- Rep. Green, Mark E. [R-TN-7] (R-TN)
- Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17] (R-NY)
- Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10] (R-TX)
- Rep. Moore, Barry [R-AL-1] (R-AL)
- Rep. Olszewski, Johnny [D-MD-2] (D-MD)
- Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27] (R-FL)
- Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6] (R-IN)
- Rep. Stanton, Greg [D-AZ-4] (D-AZ)
- Rep. Wittman, Robert J. [R-VA-1] (R-VA)
Actions (11)
- May 22, 2025 Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. · senate
- May 22, 2025 Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection. · house
- May 22, 2025 On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by voice vote. · house
- May 22, 2025 Passed/agreed to in House: On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill Agreed to by voice vote.
- May 22, 2025 Considered as unfinished business. · house
- May 19, 2025 At the conclusion of debate, the chair put the question on the motion to suspend the rules. Mr. Huizenga objected to the vote on the grounds that a quorum was not present. Further proceedings on the motion were postponed. The point of no quorum was considered as withdrawn. · house
- May 19, 2025 DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 1701. · house
- May 19, 2025 Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H2116-2119; text: CR H2116-2117) · house
- May 19, 2025 Mr. Huizenga moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill. · house
- Feb 27, 2025 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. · house
- Feb 27, 2025 Introduced in House
More bills on these subjects (8)
Other bills that carry the most legislative subjects in common with this one (topical discovery — distinct from the procedural related bills above).
Text versions (3)
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Full text
AN ACT
To require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to monitor efforts by the People’s Republic of China to build or buy strategic foreign ports, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Strategic Ports Reporting Act”.
SEC. 2. MAPPING AND STRATEGY REQUIRED.
(a) Mapping of Global Ports.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall—
(1) develop an updated, global mapping of foreign and domestic ports identified to be of importance to the United States, because of a capability to provide military, diplomatic, economic, or resource exploration superiority; and
(2) identify any efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or other PRC entities to build, buy, or otherwise control, directly or indirectly, such ports.
(b) Submission of Map.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit the mapping developed pursuant to subsection (a) to the appropriate congressional committees. Such submission shall be in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STUDY AND REPORT ON STRATEGIC PORTS.
(a) Study Required.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct a study of—
(1) strategic ports;
(2) the reasons such ports are of interest to the United States;
(3) the activities and plans of the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to expand its control over strategic ports outside of the People’s Republic of China;
(4) the public and private actors, such as China Ocean Shipping Company, that are executing and supporting the activities and plans of the Government of the PRC to expand its control over strategic ports outside of the PRC;
(5) the activities and plans of the Government of the PRC to expand its control over maritime logistics by promoting products, such as LOGINK, and setting industry standards outside the PRC;
(6) how the control by the Government of the PRC over strategic ports outside of the PRC could harm the national security or economic interests of the United States and allies and partners of the United States; and
(7) measures the United States Government could take to ensure open access and security for strategic ports and offer alternatives to PRC investments or stakes in strategic ports.
(b) Conduct of Study.—The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense may enter into an arrangement with a federally funded research and development center under which the center shall conduct the study required under subsection (a).
(c) Report.—
(1) In general.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the findings of the study conducted under subsection (a).
(2) Elements.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) a detailed list of all known strategic ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the PRC or by a foreign person of the PRC, and an assessment of the national security and economic interests relevant to each such port;
(B) a detailed list of all known strategic ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States or United States persons and an assessment of the national security and economic interests relevant to each such port;
(C) an assessment of vulnerabilities of—
(i) ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or indirectly, by the United States; and
(ii) strategic ports;
(D) an analysis of the activities and actions of the Government of the PRC to gain control or ownership over strategic ports, including promoting products, such as LOGINK, and setting industry standards;
(E) an assessment of how the Government of the PRC plans to expand its control over strategic ports outside of the PRC;
(F) a suggested strategy, developed in consultation with the heads of the relevant United States Government offices, that suggests courses of action to secure trusted investment and ownership of strategic ports and maritime infrastructure, protect such ports and infrastructure from PRC control, and ensure open access and security for such ports, that includes—
(i) a list of relevant existing authorities that can be used to carry out the strategy;
(ii) a list of any additional authorities necessary to carry out the strategy;
(iii) an assessment of products owned by the Government of the PRC or by an entity headquartered in the PRC that are used in connection with strategic ports or maritime infrastructure;
(iv) an assessment of the costs to—
(I) secure such trusted investment and ownership;
(II) replace products owned by the Government of the PRC or an entity headquartered in the PRC that are used in connection with such ports; and
(III) enhance transparency around the negative impacts of PRC control over strategic ports; and
(v) a list of funding sources to secure trusted investment and ownership of strategic ports, which shall include—
(I) an identification of private funding sources; and
(II) an identification of public funding sources, including loans, loan guarantees, and tax incentives; and
(G) a suggested strategy for Federal agencies to maintain an up-to-date list of strategic ports.
(H) an assessment of any national security threat posed by such investments or activities to United States diplomatic and defense personnel and facilities in the vicinity of such ports, including through cyber threats, electronically enabled espionage, or other means.
(3) Form of report.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The term “relevant United States Government offices” means—
(A) the Unified Combatant Commands;
(B) the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
(C) the Office of the Secretary of State;
(D) the United States International Development Finance Corporation;
(E) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(F) the Maritime Administration of the Department of Transportation.
(3) The term “strategic port” means an international port or waterway that the heads of the relevant United States Government offices determine is critical to the national security or economic prosperity of the United States.
Passed the House of Representatives May 22 (legislative day May 21), 2025.
Attest:
Clerk. 119th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 1701
AN ACT
To require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to monitor efforts by the People’s Republic of China to build or buy strategic foreign ports, and for other purposes.
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